Threat Level:

CRITICAL

During the reporting period ending Sun, 26 Jul 2026 04:30:02 GMT, our sensor network logged 29,619,493 malicious events originating from 33,306 unique attackers. The threat landscape remains dominated by high-volume automated reconnaissance and brute-force campaigns targeting legacy protocol vulnerabilities and weak administrative credentials.

Vector 1: SNMP Reconnaissance & Legacy Exploitation

Activity is heavily concentrated on SNMP service interrogation, with over 8.2 million events logged. Attackers are aggressively probing for public community strings, leveraging antiquated vulnerabilities including CVE-2002-0013 and CVE-2002-0012.

• Top Source ASN: AS14061 DIGITALOCEAN-ASN
• Primary Alert: GPL SNMP request udp

Vector 2: VNC & RDP Brute-Force Campaigns

VNC scanning continues to pose a persistent threat with 7.6 million events. Simultaneously, RDP honey-pots report high-frequency credential stuffing targeting "Administrador" and "Administrator" accounts, often utilizing obfuscated Unicode/symbolic usernames.

• Top Attacker (RDP): 185.156.73.157 (ZA)
• Top Credential Attempt: Administrador / (none)

Deduction:

The majority of attack traffic is routed through cloud-based infrastructure, specifically AS14061 (DigitalOcean) and AS44477 (Stark Industries Solutions Ltd). The presence of these ASNs suggests the usage of compromised or leased virtual private servers for distributed scanning.

Cluster 1: High-Risk Infrastructure

A significant cluster of activity originates from BR (177.8.71.27), identifying as NT FIBRA. This IP accounts for nearly 950,000 events alone, indicating a high-bandwidth automated attack node.

Action 1: Implement Geo-Blocking and ASN Filtering

Justification: Traffic originating from high-volume, non-business critical ASNs such as AS14061 and AS44477 should be rate-limited or dropped entirely to preserve bandwidth and reduce log noise.

Action 2: Disable Unnecessary SNMP and VNC Services

Justification: The massive spike in SNMP and VNC probes suggests a systematic scan of public-facing endpoints; hardening these services or moving them behind a VPN is mandatory.

Action 3: Enforce Account Lockout and NTLM/Credential Hardening

Justification: The prevalence of automated RDP attacks using common accounts like Administrador underscores the need for strict account lockout policies and the prohibition of default administrative account names.